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Case Note 
DISCHARGE OF A CONTRACT WHERE  
BOTH PARTIES ARE IN BREACH 
Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd 
[2009] 4 SLR(R) 602 
This case note examines the most recent attempt by the 
Court of Appeal to provide further guidance on: (a) how the 
doctrine of discharge of contract by breach operates when 
both parties are in breach of their contract obligations; and 
(b) when a promisee is entitled to rely on an alternate basis to 
justify its election to discharge a contract for the promisor’s 
breach when the basis originally relied upon and 
communicated to the promisor is ultimately found to be 
legally insufficient. 
THAM Chee Ho* 
BCL (Oxon); LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore); 
Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore), Solicitor (England & Wales),  
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law (New York); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
1 In Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte 
Ltd1 (“Alliance Concrete”), the Court of Appeal had the opportunity to 
address some less commonly encountered questions associated with the 
doctrine of discharge of contract for breach. Inter alia, it revisited the 
issue of discharge of contract when both contracting parties are in 
breach of contract. It also had the opportunity to elaborate upon the 
manner by which a court is to determine whether breach of a particular 
term gives rise to the right to discharge the contract for such breach, 
variously outlined in cases such as RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo 
(S) Pte Ltd2 (“RDC Concrete”), Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark 
Chuan David,3 and most recently, in Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Deuter 
Sports GmbH4 (“Sports Connection”). As will be noted later, the grounds 
of decision handed down by the Court of Appeal in Alliance Concrete 
                                                                       
* Thanks are owed to the very helpful comments of the anonymous referee. All 
errors, of course, remain my own. 
1 [2009] 4 SLR(R) 602. 
2 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413. 
3 [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663. 
4 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 883. 
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approximately two months after it had handed down its decision in 
Sports Connection do not avert to the tantalising developments hinted at 
in the earlier case.5 The “true” position so far as Singapore law is 
concerned, as to the inter-relationship between the “condition-
warranty” approach and the Hongkong Fir6 “innominate term” approach 
remains, it would seem, somewhat uncertain. 
2 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd, the appellant, was in 
the business of fabricating and supplying ready-mixed concrete for the 
construction industry, while Comfort Resources Pte Ltd, the 
respondent, was a supplier of sand. The appellant contracted to 
purchase sand over a period of one year, from 1 February 2006 to 
31 January 2007, from the respondent. The business relationship was 
not untroubled. There were allegations of late payments, short 
deliveries, and orders of sand below the contractually stipulated 
monthly minimum. 
3 On 15 September 2006, the respondent commenced an action 
against the appellant for the sum of $401,448.79, being the price of sand 
it had sold and delivered to the appellant and which was due and owing. 
It also claimed for damages for loss of profits for sand that the appellant 
ought to have ordered (as the contract required a minimum quantity to 
be ordered every month); another, slightly different question. Further, 
the respondent claimed that these failures on the part of the appellant 
demonstrated an intention on the appellant’s part to no longer be 
bound by the contract and that the appellant’s failures amounted to 
repudiatory breaches of the contract. This provided legal justification 
for the respondent’s election to discharge the contract as at 
14 September 2006, and therefore also entitled the respondent to 
damages for loss suffered as a result of such premature termination of 
the contract. The very same day, the appellant commenced a separate 
suit, claiming $1,162,984.87 or, alternatively, damages for losses arising 
from the respondent’s breach of contract through its suspension of 
deliveries of sand with effect from 20 July 2006 despite the appellant’s 
continued orders for sand beyond that date, and for having unjustifiably 
terminated the contract. 
4 At trial, the respondent was awarded final judgment on its 
claim, with damages to be assessed on the basis that the appellant ought 
to have ordered at least 40,000mt of sand every month, whereas the 
appellant’s claim was dismissed (Comfort Resources Pte Ltd v Alliance 
                                                                       
5 Some of the possible implications of Sports Connection are discussed in  
C H Tham & P W Lee, “Contract” (2009) 10 SAL Ann Review 194 at 241–243, 
paras11.121–11.125. 
6 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26. 
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Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd).7 Dissatisfied with that outcome, the 
appellant appealed – with some success, as the Court of Appeal reversed 
the trial judge’s decision in part. The Court of Appeal found that 
damages for the respondent’s claim were to be assessed on the basis of 
a minimum order of 30,000mt per month. More pertinently for present 
purposes, though, the Court of Appeal also held that the appellant’s 
claim ought not to have been dismissed, for the respondent’s attempt to 
terminate the contract was not legally justified: the respondent was, 
therefore, itself in breach of the contract. 
5 Recognising that the right to discharge a contract for breach had 
“considerable practical value because it allows a party to legitimately 
escape from an unsatisfactory commercial situation”,8 the Court of 
Appeal pointed out that any attempt to exercise such a right carried 
a certain amount of risk, for, “if a party terminates the contract without 
legal justification, it will itself be in breach of contract”9 [emphasis in 
original]. 
6 The appellant’s argument stood on two limbs. Addressing the 
first, that the respondent was itself in breach of its obligations under the 
contract by suspending supply of sand to the appellant from 20 July 
2006 and was thereby precluded from discharging the contract on 
account of the appellant’s breaches, the Court of Appeal noted that the 
point had already been clarified by its earlier observations in Jet Holding 
Ltd v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd10 (“Jet Holding Ltd”). In Jet 
Holding Ltd, the Court of Appeal had quoted with approval11 the 
statement of the law set out by the English Court of Appeal in State 
Trading Corp of India Ltd v M Golodetz12 (“Golodetz”), to wit: 
The fact that in the present case both parties had committed breaches 
before one of them elected to treat the contract as repudiated appears 
to make no difference whatever; nor the fact that (assumedly) both 
had been breaches of condition. If A is entitled to treat B as having 
wrongfully repudiated the contract between them and does so, then it 
does not avail B to point to A’s past breaches of contract, whatever 
their nature. A breach by A would only assist B if it was still continuing 
when A purported to treat B as having repudiated the contract and if 
the effect of A’s subsisting breach was such as to preclude A from 
claiming that B had committed a repudiatory breach. In other words, B 
                                                                       
7 [2008] 4 SLR(R) 848. 
8 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [30]. 
9 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [31]. 
10 [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769. 
11 Jet Holding Ltd v Cooper Cameron (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR(R) 769  
at [98]–[99]. 
12 [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 277 at 286. 
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would have to show that A, being in breach of an obligation in the 
nature of a condition precedent, was therefore not entitled to rely on B’s 
breach as a repudiation. [emphasis in italics in original; emphasis in 
bold italics added] 
7 Applying those principles to the facts of this case, the Court of 
Appeal found that the appellant’s argument on this point failed. The 
first prerequisite for the bar to apply was that the breach on the part of 
the party seeking to discharge the contract had to be a “continuing 
breach”. In the Court of Appeal’s judgment, “it would appear that the 
first prerequisite has been satisfied inasmuch as the breach by the 
Respondent is a continuing one as it had not furnished any sand to the 
Appellant since 20 July 2006”13 [emphasis in original]. It seems, 
therefore, that by a “continuing breach”, the Court of Appeal was 
referring to a non-performance that had not been made up for. So had 
supply of sand been resumed prior to the time when the respondent 
purported to discharge the contract on account of the appellant’s 
breaches, the first prerequisite might, conceivably, not have been 
satisfied. But that was not the case here. 
8 That, however, was not the end of the matter, for there were two 
prerequisites for the bar described in Golodetz14 to apply. On the second 
prerequisite, the Court of Appeal was not convinced that the 
Respondent’s “continuing breach” in suspending the supply of sand to 
the Appellant was a “condition precedent” to either of the Appellant’s 
breaches upon which the Respondent was, purportedly, basing his 
entitlement to discharge the contract. 
9 To recap, the respondent claimed to be discharging the contract 
on account of the appellant’s (a) non- and late-payment of sums due 
and owing on the contract; and/or (b) under-ordering of sand. In the 
court’s judgment, it could not be said that the continued supply of sand 
post-20 July 2006 was a condition precedent to the appellant’s 
obligation to pay sums due and owing for sand that had previously been 
delivered.15 This seems to be self-evident. Neither could it be said that 
such continued supply of sand post-20 July 2006 was a condition 
precedent to the appellant’s obligation to order the minimum monthly 
amount of sand as was required under the contract. This, the Court of 
Appeal explained as follows:16 
                                                                       
13 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [48]. 
14 State Trading Corp of India Ltd v M Golodetz [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 277 at 286. 
15 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [48]. 
16 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [49]. 
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[W]hen the Respondent refused to supply sand from 20 July 2006 
onwards …, any order for sand placed by the Appellant would, ex 
hypothesi, have been an exercise in futility. In the circumstances, any 
breach by the Appellant with respect to under-ordering would have 
occurred prior to the Respondent’s breach … Put simply, there was no 
relationship between the two breaches and, hence, the second 
prerequisite was not satisfied. 
10 Though the language may be a little convoluted, this must be 
right. As a matter of construction of the contract, the respondent’s 
obligation to supply sand must have been predicated on the appellant 
having made a prior order for such supply. If there had been no order 
(whether of at least the minimum quantity, or otherwise), there would 
have been no obligation to fill such order. So the obligation on the 
appellant to make a minimum order of sand each month could not be 
preconditioned on the respondent’s continued supply of sand to fill 
such orders. Consequently, the appellant’s first line of argument that the 
respondent was not legally entitled to discharge the contract had to fail. 
11 That, however, was not the end of the appellant’s case. Even if 
the respondent was not barred from discharging the contract on 
account of its own breach by suspending the supply of sand, the 
appellant argued that, in any event, its failure to pay and/or to order the 
minimum required volume of sand did not amount to breaches which 
entitled the respondent to discharge the contract. This entailed 
consideration as to whether these breaches by the appellant fell within 
Situation 2, Situation 3(a) or Situation 3(b) of RDC Concrete,17 as 
summarised in Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David.18 
12 Taking into account those principles, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that neither the appellant’s breaches of the obligation to 
make payment, nor of the obligation to place a minimum order each 
month, were such as to entitle the respondent to justifiably discharge the 
contract for breach. As to the former, the Court of Appeal noted that 
there was “… no evidence that the series of delayed payments by the 
Appellant (coupled with the non-payments of the amounts owed in 
May and June 2006 [to the respondent]) constituted a renunciation of 
the Contract by [the appellant] (under Situation 2 of RDC Concrete)”.19 
Had it been a case where the appellant had not paid the respondent at 
all throughout the duration of the contract, the Court of Appeal noted 
that it would have been more readily persuaded that non-payment to 
                                                                       
17 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413. 
18 [2008] 1 SLR(R) 663 at [153]–[158], and conveniently reproduced in Alliance 
Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 602 
at [32]). 
19 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [52]. 
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that extent would have constituted a renunciation. But the present facts 
were far from that case. It seemed, therefore, that this breach could not 
be taken to have amounted to a renunciation by the appellant of the 
entirety of its obligations under the contract so as to bring the case 
between Situation 2 of RDC Concrete. 
13 The Court of Appeal also noted20 that “[t]he fact that the 
Respondent accepted (albeit late) payments from the Appellant suggests 
that it did not consider the conduct of the Appellant – taken as a whole 
– as constituting a renunciation of the Contract” [emphasis added]. This 
observation is somewhat ambiguous, as it is unclear whether the Court 
of Appeal used an objective or a subjective approach in ascertaining 
what the respondent had had in mind when it accepted the appellant’s 
late payments. However, any suggestion that it might be appropriate to 
approach the ascertainment of a party’s intentions from a subjective 
perspective ought to be rejected. 
14 As the Court of Appeal stated in RDC Concrete,21 where one 
contracting party, “by his words or conduct, simply renounces its 
contract in as much as it clearly conveys to the other party to the contract 
that it will not perform its contractual obligations at all, that other party 
… is entitled to terminate the contract” [emphasis in italics in original; 
emphasis in bold italics added]. Whether particular acts or words 
amount to a renunciation, therefore, depends on whether those acts or 
words clearly convey the intention of the actor or speaker that it will not 
perform its part of the contractual bargain at all. 
15 The degree to which such intention has been conveyed clearly, 
however, must depend on the degree to which the addressee understands 
that to have been the intention to be conveyed. What the addressee is 
taken to have understood, however, is not determined subjectively. 
Rather, consistently with the usual approach taken to ascertain intention 
and knowledge, it is determined objectively. That is, whether a particular 
act or statement is to be taken to be a renunciation or otherwise 
depends on whether the reasonable man in the position of the addressee 
would understand that act or statement as showing the actor or 
speaker’s no longer intended to be bound by the contract. 
                                                                       
20 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [52]. 
21 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413 at [93]. 
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16 Adopting the analysis of the House of Lords hearing an appeal 
from the Scottish Court of Session in Forslind v Bechley-Crundall,22 
Devlin J made it clear in the English High Court case of Universal Cargo 
Carriers Corp v Citati that:23 
A renunciation can be made either by words or by conduct, provided 
it is clearly made. It is often put that the party renunciating [sic] must 
‘evince an intention’ not to go on with the contract. The intention can 
be evinced either by words or by conduct. The test of whether an 
intention is sufficiently evinced by conduct is whether the party 
renunciating [sic] has acted in such a way as to lead a reasonable person 
to the conclusion that he does not intend to fulfil his part of the 
contract. [emphasis added] 
17 One should not, therefore, take the Court of Appeal’s reference 
to how the respondent took the appellant’s breach as introducing some 
element of subjectivity into the exercise of determining whether there 
had been a clearly evinced intention (on the part of the appellant) not 
to continue with the contract. (That said, it may be that the reference to 
the respondent’s subjective intentions is relevant as regards a slightly 
different issue: that there had been no acceptance of such breach as 
being repudiatory so as to effect a discharge of the contract on the 
ground of renunciation, even if evidence of such repudiatory intent had 
been tendered.) 
18 The Court of Appeal was also of the view that the appellant’s 
obligation to effect timely payment within 60 days from supply of sand 
pursuant to cl 8 of the contract was not a “condition” within the 
meaning of Situation 3(a) of RDC Concrete:24 “There was no evidence 
construing the Contract … in the light of the surrounding 
circumstances as a whole that cl 8 was intended by the parties to be 
a condition.”25 What the court had to do was to ascertain the intention 
of the contracting parties by construing the contract as a whole, 
including the contractual term in question, in light of the surrounding 
circumstances; and, on the facts of the case, the court concluded that 
given the brevity of cl 8 which merely provided that the terms of 
payment were to be “60 days from end of each month supply”, the 
parties had not intended that any breach of cl 8 would entitle 
the innocent party to discharge the contract. It was more likely that the 
parties intended cl 8 to be applied more flexibly. Indeed, no evidence 
otherwise had been adduced by the respondent who was making the 
                                                                       
22 1922 SC(HL) 173. 
23 [1957] 2 QB 401 at 436. 
24 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413. 
25 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [53]. 
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case that it was entitled to discharge the contract for such breach. That is 
to say, time of payment was not of the essence in the contract.26 
19 For completeness’ sake, although no submissions had been 
made on the point, the Court of Appeal pointed out27 that time could 
not have been made of the essence merely by the appellant have been 
notified by the respondent of its insistence on timely payment (by way 
of a letter dated 8 September 2006). The Court accepted the analysis in 
Chitty on Contracts28 that allowing such a notice to make time of the 
essence when it was not of the essence to begin with was tantamount to 
permitting a unilateral variation of the contract. The effect of such 
notice, therefore, lay only in bringing to an end any possible 
impediment to repudiation of the contract that equitable doctrine 
might otherwise pose.29 
20 The Court of Appeal next considered whether the appellant’s 
failure to pay the sums due and owing for the May and June 2006 
deliveries amounted to a breach that fell within Situation 3(b) of RDC 
Concrete.30 It concluded that this failure “did not deprive the Respondent 
of substantially the whole benefit of the Contract that it was intended 
that the Respondent should obtain”.31 In consequence, the respondent 
was not entitled to rely on the appellant’s breach of its payment 
obligations to justify its discharge of the contract. 
21 The Court of Appeal then turned to the appellant’s breach of its 
obligation to order a minimum quantity of sand every month. This 
obligation, contained in cl 2 of the contract, was construed by the court 
in light of the language and its surrounding context as contemplating 
                                                                       
26 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [55]. 
27 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [56]. 
28 Chitty on Contracts (Sweet & Maxwell, 30th Ed, 2008) vol 1 at para 21-017. 
29 As was noted by Nourse LJ in Behzadi v Shaftesbury Hotels Ltd [1992] Ch 1 at 12: 
“Before the Judicature Acts, equity’s insistence that time was prima facie not 
essential to a contract for the sale of land was expressed either by granting specific 
performance to a party who was out of time or by restraining the other party from 
enforcing his consequential rights at law. Since the fusion of law and equity the 
view of equity has continued to prevail, but the authorities show that its patience is 
exhaustible. One example, a rare one, is where a party has delayed so long as to 
evince an intention not to be bound by the contract. In such a case the other party 
can without more treat the contract as repudiated … More commonly, equity will 
not allow the contract to be so treated unless the party in default has been given an 
opportunity to mend his ways. The only way in which that can be done is by giving 
him notice to comply within a reasonable time. Such a notice is invariably 
described as one making time of the essence of the contract …”. 
30 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413. 
31 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [57]. 
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a minimum monthly quantity of sand which the appellant was to order 
from the respondent, and which the respondent was then under 
a corresponding obligation to supply. Accordingly, it was not completely 
open to the appellant to decide how much sand it was to order, or not to 
order any sand at all.32 Given the trial judge’s finding that the appellant 
had, indeed, under-ordered and was thus in breach of cl 2, the Court of 
Appeal noted that breach of cl 2 had not been expressed as a ground for 
termination of the contract in the respondent’s correspondence with the 
appellant as to its decision to discharge the contract. That 
correspondence had relied solely on the appellant’s breach of its 
payment obligation. This raised the question as to whether the 
respondent was entitled to rely on the ground of breach of cl 2 when 
reliance had initially been upon some other ground, now found to have 
been insufficient to justify discharge (given the findings summarised 
earlier).33 
22 Here, following the English decision of Taylor v Oakes, 
Roncoroni, and Co,34 the Court of Appeal accepted that:35 
Although the innocent party must justify an election to terminate for 
breach of contract by the other party, the authorities clearly establish 
that any ground of termination which existed at the time of election 
may be relied upon. 
23 However, this was subject to various qualifications. First, as was 
noted in Panchaud Frères SA v Establissments General Grain Co36 
(“Panchaud Frères”), the innocent party may be prohibited from relying 
on an alternate ground of termination if, in light of the innocent party’s 
conduct, it would be unfair or unjust for him to do so.37 This, the Court 
of Appeal accepted, was not some “inchoate doctrine stemming from 
the manifest convenience of consistency in pragmatic affairs, negativing 
any liberty to blow hot and cold in commercial conduct” (as had been 
suggested by Winn LJ in Panchaud Frères itself), but was premised on 
the doctrines of waiver and estoppel.38 Even so, there was yet another 
qualification which was pertinent to the facts of this case. 
                                                                       
32 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [60]. 
33 See paras 18–20 of this article. 
34 (1922) 127 LT 267 at 269. 
35 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [63]. 
36 [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 53. 
37 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [65]. 
38 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [65]. 
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24 Second, the innocent party might be prevented from changing 
its justification for a purported discharge of contract if it were the case 
that had the alternate justification been raised at the time of the 
purported election to discharge the contract, it would have been 
possible for the party in breach to have removed or rectified the 
problem completely.39 That is, “… the innocent party will not be entitled 
to rely on a ground not raised at the time of termination if the party in 
breach could have rectified the situation had it been afforded the 
opportunity to do so”.40 
25 Accepting the trial judge’s finding that the appellant had 
breached cl 2 of the contract, being a breach that had not been relied 
upon initially by the respondent to justify their discharge of the 
contract, the Court of Appeal concluded that the “usual rule” set out in 
Taylor v Oakes, Roncoroni, and Co41 was inapplicable on account of the 
second qualification to that rule. In light of the evidence of a rising 
market in sand at the material time, the Court of Appeal accepted that 
had the respondent notified the appellant of its non-compliance with 
cl 2, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant would definitely have 
increased its orders to at least the minimum required level so as to 
prevent such breaches from continuing. With the rising market, there 
was no incentive for the appellant to continue to under-order. Absent 
any evidence otherwise, submissions to the contrary could only be mere 
speculation.42 Accordingly, the respondent was not entitled to rely on the 
breach of cl 2 to justify its discharge of the contract. 
26 One small question which the above analysis leaves unanswered, 
is the precise scope of the “cure” that might have been effected by the 
appellant, had it been notified of the problem with its having ordered 
too little sand for each month. Under the contract, it would appear that 
the appellant had to order a minimum quantity of sand per month. 
Consequently, it would not be possible for the respondent to inform the 
appellant about its failure to honour the minimum order requirement 
until the orders for the month had been made and totalled up. 
Therefore, the respondent would only be in a position to inform the 
appellant about its breach of the minimum order obligation after the 
monthly interval had elapsed. If so, there would, strictly speaking, never 
be any possibility for the appellant to “rectify” its breach in relation to 
orders of sand for the month that would have already elapsed. It would 
only be able to avoid making further breaches, moving forwards. If so, it 
                                                                       
39 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [66]. 
40 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [67]. 
41 (1922) 127 LT 267 at 269 (reproduced at para 22 of this article). 
42 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [72]. 
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is unclear how or why it would not be open to the respondent to rely on 
the antecedent breach of the minimum-order obligation for the second 
qualification to the Panchaud Frères principle (as to the ability of the 
appellant to rectify the breach) could not apply to such antecedent 
breach. 
27 Leaving that problem aside, the Court of Appeal also 
concluded43 that, in any event, breach of cl 2 was not a breach of 
a “condition” as would fall within Situation 3(a) of RDC Concrete.44 
Neither had its breach deprived the respondent of substantially the 
whole benefit of the contract that it was intended that it should have. 
First, the minimum quantity of sand that was to be ordered was, the 
Court of Appeal held, only 30,000mt of sand per month and not the 
40,000mt that the trial judge had held. This meant that the shortfall in 
orders was not as extreme as it would have been had the minimum 
order been at the higher figure. 
28 Nor could it be said that the effect of the under-orders on the 
respondent’s cash flow had deprived it of substantially the whole benefit 
of the contract. To establish this, the Court of Appeal was of the view 
that it was necessary, first of all, to construe the contract to ascertain 
precisely the benefit that the parties had intended for the respondent to 
obtain.45 
29 Accordingly, the Court of Appeal found that the respondent was 
not justified in terminating the contract at all. It was therefore in breach 
of contract for having unjustifiably refused to perform its part of the 
contract and was, itself, in repudiatory breach. Such breach having been 
accepted by the appellant, it followed that the appellant was entitled to 
damages for the losses it sustained as a result of the respondent’s 
repudiation of the contract. The Court of Appeal therefore ordered, 
ultimately, that the quantum of such damages, as with the quantum of 
damages payable to the respondent by the appellant for the appellant’s 
breaches, were to be assessed by the Registrar should the parties be 
unable to come to an amicable settlement by themselves. 
30 It not having been raised as to whether the parties had expressly 
intended the terms as to payment and minimum orders to be such that 
their breach were never to give rise to the possibility of discharge, it 
would, perhaps, have been inappropriate for the Court of Appeal to 
                                                                       
43 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [74]. 
44 RDC Concrete Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd [2007] 4 SLR(R) 413. 
45 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
602 at [76]; reiterating a point made in Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Deuter Sports 
GmbH [2009] 3 SLR(R) 883 at [61]–[64]. 
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consider what it would have decided had such a submission been made. 
But had such a submission been made, presumably, the Court of Appeal 
would have had occasion to put into play its observations set out in its 
grounds of decision handed down two months earlier in Sports 
Connection,46 that: 
Consistently with Diplock LJ’s views [in Hongkong Fir
47
] … it must 
surely be open to the parties to expressly agree (in clear and 
unambiguous language) that the term concerned can never give rise to 
a legal right to terminate the contract, regardless of the consequences of 
the breach of that particular term (viz, to agree to a warranty expressly 
intended by the parties). Such an agreement would, in our view, clearly 
rebut the (initial presumption that the term is an intermediate term. 
[emphasis in original] 
31 As has been noted elsewhere,48 this passage in Sports 
Connection49 may signal what is, in effect, a move back to the 
“traditional” understanding of the relationship between the “condition-
warranty” approach and the Hongkong Fir50 “innominate term” 
approach as set out by the House of Lords in Bunge Corp v Tradax SA:51 
In Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd …, the 
Court of Appeal rediscovered and reaffirmed that English law 
recognises contractual terms which, upon a true construction of the 
contract of which they are part, are neither conditions nor warranties 
but are … ‘intermediate’. A condition is a term, the failure to perform 
which entitles the other party to treat the contract as at an end. 
A warranty is a term, breach of which sounds in damages but does not 
terminate, or entitle the other party to terminate, the contract. An 
innominate or intermediate term is one, the effect of non-
performance of which the parties expressly or (as is more usual) 
impliedly agree will depend upon the nature and the consequences of 
breach. … The first question is always, therefore, whether, upon the 
true construction of a stipulation and the contract of which it is part, 
it is a condition, an innominate term, or only a warranty. … Unless 
the contract makes it clear, either by express provision or by necessary 
implication arising from its nature, purpose, and circumstances … 
that a particular stipulation is a condition or a warranty, it is an 
innominate term, the remedy for a breach of which depends upon the 
nature, consequences and effect of the breach. [emphasis added] 
                                                                       
46 Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Deuter Sports GmbH [2009] 3 SLR(R) 883 at [50]. 
47 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26 at 70. 
48 C H Tham & P W Lee, “Contract” in [2009] 10 SAL Ann Review 194 at 239–244, 
paras 11.116–11.125). 
49 Sports Connection Pte Ltd v Deuter Sports GmbH [2009] 3 SLR(R) 883 at [50]. 
50 Hongkong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 QB 26. 
51 [1981] 1 WLR 711 at 717. 
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32 No further guidance as to whether this is truly the way forward 
was provided by the Court of Appeal in Alliance Concrete52 and so it 
appears that not everything relating to the doctrine of discharge of 
contract by breach has been rendered cut and dried. But, given the 
centrality of the doctrine (or doctrines) to contract law, that, perhaps, is 
only to be expected. 
 
                                                                       
52 Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Comfort Resources Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 
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